Tirana lacks 8 of the 17 promised schools

Ida Ismail

For a decade, families and businesses in Tirana have paid a fee called the “temporary education infrastructure tax.” The promise was grand: building new schools, eliminating overcrowding, and ending two-shift teaching. However, at the end of 2025, when this tax officially ended, the balance sheet turned out to be truncated: over 7.4 billion lekë (over 70 million euros) collected, but only 9 schools built out of the 17 promised.

In December 2015, the Tirana City Council approved Decision No. 59, transforming the previous green tax into a tax on educational infrastructure. This decision was based on a 2016 feasibility study, which highlighted an alarming reality: 61 schools were over capacity and 57 of them were teaching in two shifts.

The Mayor, Erion Veliaj, promised a “revolution” that would exceed the study’s predictions: “Instead of building 3-4 schools per year, we will enable us to build 20 to 25 schools in the first year,” he declared at the time.

The tax was implemented in 2016 and was collected through the water bill, affecting every family and business in Tirana. Each family paid 1.800 lek per year, while businesses, non-profit organizations, institutions, liberal professions and the transport sector had progressive taxation from 4 thousand lek to 37 thousand lek per year.

Initially, the tax was conceived with a 7-year term (2016-2022). But, according to Law No. 68/2017 “On Local Self-Government Finances”, a temporary tax cannot last more than 3 years. However, the Municipality of Tirana went further, implemented it for an initial 7 years and extended it for another 3 years (2023-2025).

So, a "temporary" tax turned into an obligation that lasted a full 10 years, raising serious doubts about compliance with the legal framework.

According to the analysis of economic expert Ergis Sefa, the feasibility study was unrealistically optimistic, as it did not properly account for rising construction costs, inflation, bureaucratic delays and the real implementation time. In practice, this led to a situation where the tax was extended from 7 to 10 years, but still failed to cover the initial target.

Meanwhile, the financial burden on citizens and businesses became increasingly significant. Families paid through their water bills, while businesses paid twice, as consumers and as tax payers.

"I paid double, both for a small business I have, and on the water bill I have at home. Meanwhile, I don't have children," says a citizen from Tirana.

In total, according to official data: from 2016-2025, about 7.4 billion lek or over 70 million euros were collected. From 2018 to 2025 alone, revenues reach about 60 million euros.

The increase in the obligation for both families and businesses is influenced by the increase in the reference prices of apartments according to the decision published in the Official Gazette at the end of July 2023. In the report on the 2024 draft budget, the Municipality of Tirana explains that the value of the temporary educational infrastructure tax is 35% of the building tax obligation for the same entity as a family or a commercial entity.

Economic expert Sefa says that businesses unrelated to education (wholesale/retail stores, professional offices, etc.) and families without children in Tirana's public schools paid without benefiting. "This violates the principle of direct benefit in service from local taxes and increases the fiscal burden unrelated to the service received," he underlined.

PPP scheme and high costs

After the 2019 earthquake, a large part of the schools in Tirana were rebuilt with funds from international donors, or through public-private partnerships (PPP), a model that aims to ease the initial financial burden on the state, but which often makes the project more expensive for taxpayers in the long run. The contracts were of the PBOT type: Design, Build, Finance and Maintain. The first two concessions cost around 35 million euros and produced 9 schools. The average cost per school reached 5-5.4 million euros, while the companies benefited from a profit rate of 6.28% per year. But this process also lasted beyond time and financial forecasts.

According to expert Sefa, the PPP scheme may be fast in the short term, but it usually makes the project more expensive for taxpayers in developing countries like Albania: “In lots Tirana 1 and Tirana 4, the private sector finances the construction, but receives annual payments from the budget (partly from this tax) plus a profit margin for 7-8 years after delivery. Citizens pay twice, once with a direct tax and once through periodic payments plus higher maintenance costs. From the data, a good part of the receipts went to the concessionaires (about 1.85 billion lek until 2024 for two contracts).”

For residents of rapidly developing areas, the tax brought no change. In Astir, Yzberisht, and Liqeni i Thatë, the lack of public schools remains a stubborn fact.

Isa Halilaj, vice president of the Education Union, points out that quality is declining:
"The number of students in the class goes up to 36, while the maximum should have been 31."

Meanwhile, the opposition representative in the Municipal Council, Dorian Teliti, denounces the lack of transparency: "The audit of these funds has not been done since 2021. Parents in many areas are forced to turn to private schools because public infrastructure is lacking."

Accounting expert Erinda Myqelefi estimates that since over 80% of the planned funds have been collected, at least 14 schools should have been completed: "Under these conditions, the tax can be considered partially efficient, but it has failed to meet its objectives."

Regarding the discrepancy in the target of the money collected for the construction of 17 schools, the Municipality of Tirana has stated that the tax revenues were allocated for the construction, furnishing and maintenance of the schools, as well as for the repayment of obligations under PPP contracts. However, these funds proved insufficient, forcing the deficit to be covered by the general budget of the municipality. This fact proves that the real cost of the educational infrastructure exceeded the initial planning, making the tax an incomplete tool for the realization of the promised objectives.

Accounting expert Erinda Myqelefi says this case reflects weaknesses in public financial planning: “The success of a tax is not measured solely by the amount collected, but by the ability to translate it into concrete, tangible results. When this connection weakens, the perception of fiscal injustice increases and public confidence in financial policies weakens, even for other taxes in the future.”

The question that remains after the closure of this tax is: who will be responsible for the 8 schools that remain only on paper and for the over 70 million euros that failed to eliminate two-shift teaching in the capital?

Beyond the failure of the figures, this case sets a dangerous precedent where "emergency" is used as a justification to impose endless taxes, which ultimately do not solve the problem for which they were created.acqj/al